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Beyond the Trident
Alternatives Review
Britain is urged to commit to nuclear business as usual
Since the start of 2013 a number of high-level current and former policy-makers have been
forcefully insisting that the UK maintain its current nuclear weapons policy for the foreseeable
future, people like defence secretary Philip Hammond, former Labour defence secretaries George
Robertson and John Hutton, and former First Sea Lord Alan West.1 This means replacing the
current Trident system with a like-for-like system and maintaining current nuclear policy of
‘continuous-at-sea deterrence’ (CASD) whereby one of the UK’s four ballistic missile submarines is
at sea on operational patrol in the Atlantic at all times ready to fire within days, or even hours of a
decision to do so.
This is a unique opportunity 
for an informed debate
Why the flurry of activity? Because the
government’s Trident Alternatives Study is
nearing completion and is due to be delivered
to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime
Minister any time now and those in favour of
the status quo are keen to pre-empt its
conclusions and close down the debate. But
the debate can, and must, stay open. 
We must take the possibility of moving our
nuclear policy further down the path that
reduces the salience of nuclear weapons in
international politics seriously. 
Hammond et al insist we must stick with a
like-for-like replacement and CASD. Any
alternative will undermine our security and
bring no benefit. 
Dr Nick Ritchie
University of York
April 2013
Their collective case rests on a fixed idea of
nuclear deterrence and a narrow view of wider
nuclear responsibilities. The arguments below
challenge this view, and are presented as answers
to four questions:
Q1. Is what counts as a ‘credible’ 
nuclear deterrent threat fixed?
Q2. Do we need to keep our nuclear
weapons permanently at sea?
Q3. Are there examples of alternative
nuclear force postures?
Q4. Are there any benefits from 
changing nuclear policy 
British American 
Security Information 
Council
www.basicint.org
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Trident Alternatives Study 
Trident Alternatives Study 
was a coalition compromise
The Liberal Democrats have always been
unhappy with the programme to replace
Trident with a like-for-like system set out by
Labour in its 2006 White Paper on The
Future of United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
and initiated by parliamentary vote in March
2007. In order to satisfy Liberal Democrat
concerns the government’s Coalition
Agreement negotiated after the 2010 general
election stated that ‘we will maintain Britain’s
nuclear deterrent, and have agreed that the
renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to
ensure value for money. Liberal Democrats
will continue to make the case for
alternatives’.2 In May 2011 agreement was
reached that the government will conduct a
formal 18-month assessment of ‘credible
alternatives’ to a like-for-like replacement led
by the Cabinet Office to report to both David
Cameron and Nick Clegg.3
Terms of Reference for the
Alternatives Review
“The scope of the work will be limited to the
following questions:
(i) Are there credible alternatives to a
submarine-based deterrent?
(ii) Are there credible submarine-based
alternatives to the current proposal, e.g.
modified Astute using cruise missiles?
(iii) Are there alternative nuclear postures,
i.e. non-CASD, which could maintain
credibility?
“The analysis should make an assessment of
how alternatives could be delivered, the
feasibility, cost and industrial implications,
level of risk and credibility.”4
Conservatives are sticking to
existing policy
The Conservative leadership has been, and
remains, dismissive. The only option for the
UK, they argue, is a like-for-like replacement
of the current system and continuation of the
CASD policy. David Cameron’s view in 2010
was that ‘the Liberal Democrats are
absolutely entitled to use the time between
now and 2016 to look at alternatives, from
looking at those alternatives I do not think
that any of them would give us the assurance
of having a full-service nuclear deterrent
with the Trident submarine and missile
system. I do not think the alternatives come
up to scratch in anything like the ways some
of their proponents propose, but under our
coalition agreement he is free to continue to
look at that. The programme for replacing
Trident is on track and going ahead.’5 The
outcome of the alternatives review will not
change Conservative policy, though several
leading Conservatives have expressed their
scepticism, including former Conservative
defence secretary Michael Portillo who
argued in November 2012 that replacing
Trident was “nonsense… completely past its
sell by date … its a tremendous waste of
money, its done entirely for reasons of
national prestige, it is wasteful and, at the
margins, it is proliferatory.”6 There remains
some level of uncertainty around whether
the leadership will be willing to accept
inevitable cutbacks in other defence
capabilities at the expense of the Trident
replacement programme that is set to
dominate defence procurement spending for
the next decade and a half.
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Labour policy remains in flux
There are some in the Labour Party
committed to the case set out in the 2006
White Paper that the UK must remain a
nuclear weapon state and that a like-for-like
replacement continuously at sea is the
appropriate solution, people such as Lords
West, Robertson and Hutton. Others harbour
serious concerns about nuclear ‘business-as-
usual’ and think the UK should relinquish
nuclear weapons altogether or substantially
alter its nuclear policy. Former defence
secretary Des Browne argued in response to
Hammond that the UK could and should
end the current practice of CASD and look
seriously at alternative nuclear postures that
reduce the financial burden of a nuclear
capability and reduce the salience of nuclear
weapons for our national security.7
Question 1. 
Is what counts as a ‘credible’
nuclear deterrent threat fixed?
The official line from the shadow cabinet is
that they are awaiting the outcome of the
Trident Alternatives Review and the BASIC
Trident Commission.8 Internal party debate
will be resolved through the policy review
and manifesto drafting process through
2013-14. Ever wary of being positioned as
‘weak’ on defence, the Labour leadership
remains instinctively cautious on all things
nuclear. The traumatic history of nuclear
weapons decisions within the party during
the Polaris and Trident debates of the 1960s
and 1980s that threatened to tear it apart still
resonate.
The Alternatives Study’s terms of reference
refer to a ‘credible’ deterrent but the criteria
for what counts as credible are not set in
stone. 
Official UK definition of
minimum credible deterrence
seems inflexible
The theory of nuclear deterrence says you
can prevent a nuclear or major conventional
military attack by another state by
threatening a nuclear attack in response. The
prospect of nuclear devastation will change
an aggressor’s calculation of the costs and
benefits of its actions, causing it to rethink.
Current UK policy says that a credible and
therefore effective nuclear deterrent threat
requires up to 40 thermonuclear weapons
deliverable by ballistic missiles of global
reach from a submarine permanently at sea.
Anything less than this is deemed not
credible and therefore not effective.
Deterrence remains theoretical
with conceptual weaknesses
We should be cautious of such definitive
statements for two reasons. First, we have,
mercifully, never experienced a nuclear war
(the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945 was a
one-sided affair) and as a result many
arguments about nuclear strategy simply
cannot be verified. Nuclear strategy has
remained hypothetical and based on certain
sets of logic rather than evidence; subjective
political judgment rather than objective fact.9
Walter Slocombe, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy for President Clinton,
observed in 2006 that “Discussion of nuclear
weapons is almost entirely done in
theoretical and conceptual terms. This has an
important influence on how nuclear weapons
decisions are made”10 Furthermore, the
practice of nuclear deterrence is not a
rational, objective, exact science and a
growing body of evidence indicates that the
seemingly straight forward cause-and-effect
equation at its heart is unreliable and success
is far from assured. 
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Part of this lies in the fact that nuclear
deterrence is a process, or a relationship, not
an objective condition, and part of it rests on
the extreme difficulty of linking nuclear use
to any rational system of political means and
ends.11
There are wide global variations
in nuclear deterrent practices
Second, ideas about what constitutes a
‘credible’ and therefore ‘effective’ nuclear
deterrent threat have varied considerably
across countries and within countries over
time. India, for example, practiced a recessed
form of nuclear deterrence through the 1980s
and 1990s based on non-weaponisation of its
nascent nuclear weapons capability. This
‘weaponless deterrence’ was judged to exert
sufficient a deterrent effect with Pakistan
based on the mere possibility that major
aggression could result in a nuclear
encounter.12 In the United States, by contrast,
a form of ‘maximum’ deterrence was
practiced during the Cold War that based
effective, credible deterrence on nuclear
primacy and a whole range of nuclear forces
from nuclear shells for front-line troops to
plans for nuclear-tipped ballistic missile
interceptors.13 As a result of the interplay of
history, technology and bureaucratic politics
US conceptions of effective and credible
deterrence still rest on the idea of a ‘triad’ of
strategic nuclear forces: long-range bombers,
sea-launched ballistic missiles, land based
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Anything
less is judged not sufficiently credible.
Contrast this with the deterrent effect of
North Korea’s suspected handful of nuclear
weapons with uncertain delivery capability,
that some believe may have played a part in
preventing the removal of the odious Kim
dynasty. 
The idea of nuclear deterrence is therefore a
moveable feast, and one whose oft-asserted
certainties are plagued by considerable
conceptual weaknesses. It is not an objective
condition and it rests, ultimately, on how a
nuclear weapon state chooses to define it in
order to legitimise its nuclear arsenal, policy
and practice.14
There are actually a spectrum 
of deterrence options for the UK
Advocates of a CASD nuclear policy insist we
face an either/or dichotomy: either we have a
like-for-like Trident replacement and CASD
and have a ‘credible’ deterrent threat or we
don’t; there is no ‘half-way house’, no ‘part-
time deterrent’; it is one or the other. They go
as far as to say that any attempt at achieving
a middle ground will automatically lead to
instability in a future crisis, because an
adversary may be more tempted to call bluff
on a system that does not feature highly in
British military doctrine and because they
might be tempted to use a pre-emptive strike
before such a system could come online. The
reality is more complex and forces us to
think not in terms of either/or decisions but
in terms of a spectrum of nuclear deterrence
from the extremes of Cold War maximum
deterrence right through the UK’s current
practices down to what has been called
‘virtual’ nuclear deterrence whereby a state’s
nuclear weapons are stored in a dismantled
state with programmes in place to
reconstitute and redeploy within a specific
time frame. This is one key dimension of
what is at stake in the Trident alternative
debate: the idea of a spectrum of nuclear
deterrence practices along which the UK
might move vs. an either/or false dichotomy
of either CASD or nothing.
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Question 2. 
Do we need to keep our nuclear
weapons permanently at sea?
CASD is a tactic against 
a bolt from the blue
Defence secretary Philip Hammond et al
insist we can only exert a credible and
therefore effective nuclear deterrent threat
with nuclear forces permanently at sea. Why?
Because the credibility of a nuclear deterrent
threat requires nuclear forces to be 100%
invulnerable to a pre-emptive ‘bolt from the
blue’ attack that could wipe out our entire
nuclear weapons enterprise in a single blow. 
But Russia is not now 
an existential threat
But scratch beneath the surface of this
argument and the only country that can
deliver such an attack against the UK now
and for the foreseeable future is Russia and it
is widely and officially acknowledged that
the Cold War is truly over and that the
possibility of a surprise Russian nuclear first-
strike is so low as to be near zero, now and
for the foreseeable future.15 In fact the
government acknowledges that the UK faces
no major direct nuclear threat and hasn’t for
nearly two decades since we de-targeted our
nuclear forces in the early 1990s.16 That is
fully one third of the time we have been a
nuclear power (we conducted our first
nuclear test in 1952) in which we have faced
no threat that might conceivably invoke
serious consideration of use. That must give
pause for thought. One cannot rule out the
possibility that this could change, but if an
existential military, primarily nuclear, threat
to the very survival of the country were to
emerge we could over time reconstitute a
continuous patrol if that were deemed
necessary.
Look at the uncertainties from
the perspective of the aggressor
Nevertheless, some insist that any sign of
invulnerability, any chink in the nuclear
armour, will be seized upon by an adversary
and invite a devastating pre-emptive attack in
a crisis.17 It is only CASD that keeps us safe,
but this assertion (and that is what it is) rests
on several problematic assumptions: First,
any state contemplating a pre-emptive
strategic attack would have to be absolutely
confident that we did not, in fact, have a
nuclear-armed submarine at sea at the time
of its attack. Second, it would have to be
absolutely certain that our entire nuclear
retaliatory capability could be eliminated,
that all our nuclear warheads had been
destroyed or rendered undeliverable by other
means, at that point and for at least the
foreseeable future. Third, an adversary would
also have to be absolutely confident that it
would not suffer a devastating response from
the United States and other NATO allies.
Fourth, that even with all these assumptions
met, that there would be sufficient reason for
a potential adversary to launch a nuclear
attack, with all the devastating impact upon
its self in terms of economic, political and
diplomatic blow-back.
Uncertainty is sufficient
deterrent enough
Would an adversary’s calculus change
dramatically in favour of pre-emptive strike
if there were, for example, an 80 per cent
chance of nuclear retaliation, or 60 per cent
or 40 per cent, rather than 100 per cent?
Undoubtedly it would not. If one believes in
the logic of nuclear deterrence at all, as
Messrs Hammond, Robertson, and Hutton
surely do, then the very presence of nuclear
weapons and the uncertainty of total success
in pre-emptive measures induces appropriate
caution. 
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Abandoning CASD would not
force us to escalate in a crisis
Okay, but surely, as Hammond and others
have argued, if we did not have a nuclear-
armed submarine at sea and we found
ourselves in a serious crisis, a decision to sail
a submarine would risk unintentional
escalation leading to heightened chances of
conflict. Far better, it is argued, to maintain
CASD and avoid this hypothetical scenario
altogether.18 True, this risk cannot be
eliminated. But, once again, rather than
accepting this argument as the ‘truth’, we
must to look at our nuclear weapons policy
in the context of our abiding commitment
that we, as a country, would only ever use
nuclear weapons in accordance with
international humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict. We have explicitly accepted
the judgment of the 1996 International Court
of Justice ICJ Advisory Opinion on the
‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons’ that ‘the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the
rules of international law, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law’
and that the only circumstances in which
nuclear use might be lawful is in ‘an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very
survival of a State would be at stake’
(emphasis added).19
Worrying about crisis 
signaling is a distraction
If a crisis unfolded in which the possible use
of our nuclear weapons was a real possibility
because the very survival of the state was at
stake, any decision to sail a nuclear-armed
submarine would likely be part of a much
wider and observable mobilisation of the
UK’s armed forces rather than this singular
event. In such grave circumstances it is
doubtful the government would be overly
concerned or preoccupied with political
signaling through the mobilization of this or
that military capability. In any case,
maintaining CASD does not eliminate the
potential for crisis instability any more than
ending CASD might exacerbate it. In a crisis
where the use of nuclear weapons is
considered a genuine possibility because the
survival of the state is at stake it is quite
possible (perhaps probable) that the
government would prepare a second Trident
submarine for operational deployment to
complement the single submarine routinely
on operational patrol in a CASD posture
given the seriousness of the crisis.20
There are in any case ways to
mitigate unintended crisis
signals
In any event, the unintended impacts of a
decision to deploy a Trident submarine could
be reduced in a number of ways. We could,
for example, hold a nuclear-armed
submarine in port for a period of months on
enhanced alert ready to sail at short notice if
intelligence suggests a heightened probability
of attack. We regularly maintained a second
Resolution-class submarine armed with
Polaris ballistic missiles at 24 hours notice to
fire its missile in port and 47 hours notice to
sail to join the SSBN on patrol during the
Cold War.21
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Question 3. 
Are there examples of alternative
nuclear force postures?
There are a number of examples of nuclear
forces being taken off continuous alert but
with plans in place to return them to full
readiness if required. Here are just two:
1) US nuclear cruise on low alert
In 1992 the US Navy withdrew its nuclear-
armed Tomahawk cruise missiles
(Tomahawk Land Attack Missile – Nuclear,
or TLAM-N) from operational duty as part
of the Bush-Gorbachev (later Yeltsin)
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives to reduce,
retire and consolidate a range of nuclear
forces after the Cold War in 1991 and 1992.
The missiles and warheads were “secured in
central areas where they would be available if
necessary in a future crisis”.22 Procedures
were put in place to enable the redeployment
of TLAM-N cruise missiles on US attack
submarines in a crisis. This included periodic
certification of a number of attack
submarines in the US Pacific and Atlantic
fleets and Quality Assurance and
Surveillance Tests (QAST) that involved a
live test-firing of an unarmed TLAM-N to
ensure the submarines could deploy and fire
the missiles within 30 days of a decision to
redeploy.23 The submarines were upgraded
with the necessary combat control systems,
the missiles and warheads were maintained
ashore, and crews were routinely trained and
certified for nuclear operations. The missile
was formally retired in the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review, but this working practice
remained official policy for 18 years. 
2) NATO nuclear arrangements
are on long alert status
Nuclear deterrence remains a key part of
NATO’s military posture and the US
maintains between 150 and 240 forward-
deployed B61 nuclear bombs at six airbases
in Turkey, Germany, Italy, Holland and
Belgium under ‘dual key’ arrangements. 
They are assigned for delivery by F-15, F-16
and Tornado fighter aircraft referred to as
Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA).24 The size and
readiness of this nuclear arsenal has been
reduced significantly since the end of the
Cold War.25 In 1995 the DCA fleet was
reduced to a readiness posture measured in
weeks rather than hours and minutes and in
2002 this was extended to months.26 Hans
Kristensen argues that ‘a readiness level of
‘months’ suggests that some of the
mechanical and electronic equipment on the
fighter aircraft needed to arm and deliver the
nuclear bombs may have been removed and
placed in storage’27 The nuclear mission is
maintained through pilot training, regular
Nuclear Surety Inspections, NATO Tactical
Evaluations and Steadfast Noon nuclear
strike exercises.28
There are credible reduced-
readiness options for the UK
These examples demonstrate the possibility
of operating UK nuclear weapons under a
different conception of deterrence that
maintains nuclear forces at much lower levels
of readiness for a significant period. This
could be based on nuclear-armed cruise
missile capability deployed aboard the UK’s
new Astute-class attack submarines – an
option favoured by the Liberal Democrats. It
could be based on ballistic missile
submarines and Trident missiles in which the
submarines are dedicated to the nuclear
mission or configured as dual use
submarines for nuclear and conventional
missions.  In fact, with serious and enduring
pressure on the defence budget the armed
services are increasingly opting for flexible,
multi-use capabilities for other military
equipment. 
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Question 4. 
Are there any benefits from 
changing nuclear policy? 
Changing posture will 
save lots of money
If we accept that our understandings of
deterrence are more fluid that Hammond et
al would have us think and if we accept that
we can think about stepping back from a
CASD nuclear policy and configure our
nuclear forces differently, then we come to
the question of why? Economics play a
substantial part in this with sustained
resistance to spending at least £25 billion on
replacing the current Trident system over the
next two decades during a period of
economic decline, growing hardship as
public spending is slashed, and a defence
budget under severe long-term pressure.
Even a decision to reduce the number of
nuclear patrols today would lead to
substantial savings from running costs, from
an increase in the life-expectancy of the
current submarines (enabling a delay to the
investment required), a reduction in the
number of future ballistic missile
submarines, and their longer life expectancy
in turn. 
UK needs to continue its
leadership on nuclear
disarmament
A second part of the answer refers to the
UK’s responsibility as one of the five
countries formally recognized as a ‘Nuclear
Weapon State’ under the 1968 Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT
– the others being the US, Russia, France and
China) to take a leadership role with others
to make serious and sustained progress
towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Just
a month after the Labour government
announced its intention to begin the process
of replacing the current Trident system in
December 2006, a new global opportunity to
rethink nuclear weapons policies began to
take shape.
Recent US initiatives are
reigniting the today’s global
push for global nuclear
disarmament
In a seminal article in the Wall Street Journal
in January 2007 former US Secretaries of
State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz,
former Secretary of Defense William Perry,
and Senator Sam Nunn called for ‘A World
Free of Nuclear Weapons’.29 The article
argued that ‘The end of the Cold War made
the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American
deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to
be a relevant consideration for many states
with regard to threats from other states. But
reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose
is becoming increasingly hazardous and
decreasingly effective’. The four asked: ‘What
will it take to rekindle the vision shared by
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-
wide consensus be forged that defines a
series of practical steps leading to major
reductions in the nuclear danger?’ They set
out a number of steps requiring US
leadership and said we need to reassert ‘the
vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and
practical measures toward achieving that
goal... Without the bold vision, the actions
will not be perceived as fair or urgent.
Without the actions, the vision will not be
perceived as realistic or possible.’ They
repeated their call for progress with a second
article in January 2008, this time they with
the support of Gorbachev in Russia and a
host of senior former foreign and defence
officials in the US, including former
Secretary of State General Colin Powell,
followed by three more in January 2010,
March 2011 and March 2013.30
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And governments 
have adopted the call
Their powerful call for the international
community to work towards a world free of
nuclear weapons injected the possibility and
urgency of nuclear disarmament with new
credibility. It became a central plank of the
Obama administration’s foreign policy
articulated in full in a major speech on
nuclear disarmament in Prague in April
2009.31 The call was soon joined by citizens,
officials, parliamentarians, business and faith
leaders, and former senior policy-makers
beyond America’s shores, including many
from the UK, leading to a major
international ‘Global Zero’ initiative
launched in Paris in December 2008.32
An International Commission on Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
sponsored by Japan and Australia was set up
and released its final report on Eliminating
Nuclear Threats - A Practical Agenda for
Global Policymakers in December 2009, and
a powerful statement by 100 international
leaders from across the world and the
political spectrum in October 2011 calling
on heads of state to launch multilateral
negotiations on nuclear elimination with a
Nuclear Weapons Summit.33
The UK also supports the goal
The Labour and Coalition governments both
declared their full commitment to this goal
and a desire to take an active leadership role
in examining the practical steps and
challenges involved. In that context in June
2007 Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett
declared that ‘When it comes to building this
new impetus for global nuclear disarmament,
I want the UK to be at the forefront of both
the thinking and the practical work. To be, as
it were, a “disarmament laboratory”.’34
The UK has acted to reduce 
its dependence on nuclear
weapons
The UK likes to frame itself as the most
‘progressive’ of the Nuclear Weapon States. 
It has taken a number of important steps to
reduce the size, increase the transparency,
and limit the operational posture and
declaratory policy of its nuclear forces since
the end of the Cold War. It has ended nuclear
testing, ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, ended production of fissile materials
for use in nuclear weapons, declared its full
commitment to nuclear weapons-free world
and supported a number of initiatives
towards that end. It agreed at the NPT
Review Conference in May 2010 along with
the other Nuclear Weapons States to ‘further
diminish the role and significance of nuclear
weapons in all military and security
concepts, doctrines and policies’ and to
‘commit to undertake further efforts to
reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of
nuclear weapons, deployed and non-
deployed, including through unilateral,
bilateral, regional and multilateral
measures.’35
But there are bigger benefits 
to moving further down the
disarmament ladder
An opportunity now exists to continue on
this trajectory and demonstrate international
leadership in new ways by taking concrete
steps to further diminish the salience of UK
nuclear weapons in national security policy
by reducing the operational readiness and
size of its nuclear arsenal.  The key to taking
such steps is rethinking the commitment to
continuous-at-sea deterrence and the
argument that a credible and therefore
effective nuclear deterrent threat requires
100% assurance of immediate and certain
nuclear retaliation in all conceivable
circumstances. This is eminently plausible in
an era of negligible military threats to the
survival of the UK. 
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We are not talking here, in the context of the
Trident Alternatives Study at least, of
relinquishing nuclear weapons but of
rethinking how we understand nuclear
deterrence with a view to reducing their
salience, whilst retaining the capability to
deploy nuclear weapons within a specific
period of time in the event of a major
military threat to the survival of the state.
We now face a major
opportunity for UK to 
contribute to global security
A further consolidation of UK nuclear
weapons policy could set important
precedents for progress towards global zero
by establishing new norms of deterrence
doctrine and practice for one of the original
nuclear powers and one of the three
depository states of the NPT. 
BASIC is a small, transatlantic non-profit
organization, working to build confidence in a
shared, sustainable security agenda.  We seek to
test traditional concepts of nuclear deterrence
as a security safeguard, and to bring policy-
shapers together to focus on the collective
security interests of non-proliferation and
disarmament.
BASIC works in both nuclear weapon and non-
nuclear weapon states, with a specific expert
focus on the United Kingdom, United States,
Europe and the Middle East.  By bridging
political and geographical divides, creating
links between different perspectives in the
nuclear weapons policy debate, and improving
processes of negotiation and decision-making
over nuclear weapons, we aim to address some
of the strategic challenges posed by the
changing global nuclear landscape.
BASIC is not a conventional advocacy
organization.  Nor is it a traditional think tank.
What distinguishes BASIC from other
organizations is our uniquely non-partisan,
dialogue-based approach. We provide a discreet
forum for constructive engagement between
individuals from different geographical,
political or cultural backgrounds on
traditionally sensitive or complex issues.  
Our aim is to break
through existing
barriers, rather than
reinforce entrenched
thinking; to build
understanding of
different perspectives
and identify
commonalities; to use this to encourage fresh
or alternative approaches; and to feed these
findings back in to existing policy debate.
Our work aims to complement that of policy-
makers, think-tanks, research organizations and
advocacy groups.
For more information please visit our website:
www.basicint.org
BASIC in London
3 Whitehall Court
London SW1A 2EL
Tel: +44 (0) 207 766 3461 / 65
BASIC in Washington
110 Maryland Ave., NE Suite 205
Washington, DC 20002
Tel: +1 (0) 202 546 8055
Such a move would clearly indicate that the
UK no longer sees a compelling reason to
deploy nuclear weapons for immediate use
but were being temporarily retained pending
global elimination. A non-CASD posture
would all but eliminate any intention to use
nuclear weapons first in a crisis at short
notice thereby reinforcing political and legal
commitments to non-nuclear weapon states
and providing a degree of strategic
reassurance to other possessors of nuclear
weapons. It would signify an important ‘de-
coupling’36 of nuclear weapons from the
broad, day-to-day calculus of national
security by demonstrating that the UK is
prepared to learn to live without nuclear
weapons operationally deployed at sea on a
permanent basis as a precursor to learning to
live without nuclear weapons operationally
deployed at all.37
About BASIC (British American Security Information Council)
Dr Nick Ritchie                                         www.basicint.org 11
1  Philip Hammond, “The alternatives to
Trident carry an enormous risk”, The
Telegraph, 2 February 2013; Alan West,
“Discarding Trident would not aid
disarmament; it would only imperial UK
security”, The Independent, 26 February
2013; George Robertson and John Hutton,
“There is no magic alternative to Trident –
Britain has got to keep it”, The Telegraph, 28
February 2013.
2  The Cabinet Office, ‘The Coalition: Our
Programme for Government’, London, 20
May 2010, p. 15,
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409
088/pfg_coalition.pdf, date accessed 14
June 2010.
3  ‘Work on Trident nuclear renewal gets go
ahead’, BBC News Online, 18 May 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
13438420, date accessed 19 May 2011. The
Trident Alternatives terms of reference can
be found at
http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/deposit
edpapers/2011/DEP2011-0825.zip, date
accessed 14 September 2011.
4  “Trident Alternatives Study – Terms of
Reference”, May 2011.
5  House of Commons, Official Report, 19
October 2010, Column 807.
6  BBC News, “Michael Portillo on Trident
nuclear replacement plans”, 2 November
2012, speaking The Daily Politics show.
Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-20179604.
7  Des Browne and Ian Kearns, “Trident is no
longer key to Britain’s security”, The Daily
Telegraph, 5 February 2013.
8  Nicholas Watt, “Labour to present plan to
close defence budget gap”, The Guardian, 1
October 2012.
9  Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear
Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of
Armageddon (Ihaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989), pp. 104 & 182.
10  Walter Slocombe. (2006), Democratic
Control of Nuclear Weapons, Policy Paper
No. 12, Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, 2006, p.
7.
11  See Anthony Burke, “Nuclear Reason: At
the Limits of Strategy”, International
Relations, 23: 4, 2009; Ward Wilson, Five
Myths about Nuclear Deterrence (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013).
12  George Perkovich, “Trip Report. Pakistan
and India,” September 10-22, 1992, pp. 5-6.
13  Tom Sauer, “A Second Nuclear
Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-
Existential Deterrence”, Journal of Strategic
Studies, 2009, 32:5,745-67.
14  Nicholas Wheeler, “Minimum Deterrence
and Nuclear Abolition”, in Cowen Karp, R.,
Security Without Nuclear Weapons,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.
250.
15  ‘Joint Declaration by the President of the
Russian Federation and the Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland’, Moscow, 15 February
1994.
16  This was stated in MoD (1998) op. cit.,
paragraph 23 and reiterated in Cabinet
Office (2009) National Security Strategy of
the United Kingdom, Cm 7590 (London:
HMSO), p. 65.
17  See MoD & FCO, The Future of the United
Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, p. 22 and Box
5-2, p. 27.
18  MoD (1998) op. cit., paragraph 13.
19  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion at the request
of the UN General Assembly, ICJ Reports, 8
July 1996, para 95.
20  Owen Price, ‘Preparing for the Inevitable:
Nuclear Signalling for Regional Nuclear
Crises’, Comparative Strategy, 26:2, 2007,
p.105.
Endnotes
Beyond the Trident Alternatives Review12
21  UK Strategic Nuclear Forces – Short Term
Working Party Report, 3 June 1971, TNA,
DEFE-19-190-e6. Cited in John Ainslie,
‘Overcoming Operational Obstacles to
Reduced Readiness’, working paper for a
workshop at the University of Bradford on
options for Trident replacement in
September 2009.
22  Cited in Brian Alexander and Alistair
Millar (Eds), Tactical Nuclear Weapons,
Brassey’s, Inc: Dulles, VA, 2003, p. 169.
23  Robert Norris, William Arkin, Hans
Kristensen and Joshua Handler, “U.S.
Nuclear Forces, 2001”, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March-April 2001; Nuclear
Weapons Systems Sustainment Programs,
Office the Secretary of Defense (US
Department of Defense: Washington, D.C.),
May 1997.
24  Hans Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Forces in
Europe (Washington, D.C.: Natural
Resources Defense Council, 2005), p. 11.
25  Hans Kristensen, ‘The Minot
Investigations: From Fixing Problems to
Nuclear Advocacy’, FAS Security Blog, 14
January 2009,
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/01/schles
ingerreport.php#more-669, date accessed
17 January 2009; Hans Kristensen, ‘U.S.
Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn from the
United Kingdom’, FAS Security Blog, 26
June 2008,
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/usnucl
ear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-united-
kingdom.php, date accessed 30 June 2008.
26  NATO (1995) ‘NATO’s Nuclear Forces in
the New Security Environment’ (Brussels:
NATO)
http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/sec-
environment.html, date accessed 17 April
2010.
27  Kristensen (2005) op. cit., p. 68.
28  Kristensen (2005) op. cit., p. 64; John
Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb
(Scottish CND: Glasgow, 2005), p. 68.
29  H. Kissinger, W. Perry, G. Shultz and S.
Nunn, ‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons’,
Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007.
30  H. Kissinger, W. Perry, G. Shultz and S.
Nunn, ‘Toward a Nuclear Free World’, Wall
Street Journal, 15 January 2008; H.
Kissinger, W. Perry, G. Shultz and S. Nunn,
‘Deterrence in the Age of Proliferation’, Wall
Street Journal, 7 March 2011; H. Kissinger,
W. Perry, G. Shultz and S. Nunn, ‘Next
Steps in Reducing Dangers’, Wall Street
Journal, 5 March 2013.
31  Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President
Barack Obama’, Hradcany Square, Prague,
Czech Republic, 5 April 2009.
32  Global Zero authors, ‘Scrapping Nuclear
Arms is Now Realpolitik’, The Times, 1
April 2009.
33  See
http://www.globalzero.org/en/pressrelease/f
mr-secretary-state-george-shultz-today-
global-zero-summit-ronald-
reaganpresidential-l, date accessed 17
October 2011.
34  Margaret Beckett, ‘A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons?’, Carnegie International
Nonproliferation Conference, Keynote
Address, 25 June 2007.
35 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons: Final Document Volume
1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I) (New York:
United Nations Organisation, 2010), p. 18.
36  Michael Mazarr, ‘Nuclear Doctrine and
Virtual Nuclear Arsenals’ in M. Mazarr
(ed.) Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed
World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear
Arsenals (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1997), p. 47.
37  For a more detailed discussion of these
themes see Nick Ritchie, A Nuclear
Weapons-Free World? Britain, Trident, and
the Challenges Ahead (Abindgon: Palgrave,
2013).
